This paper seeks to explore the synergies between budget and policy through the use of what was called 'spending conditionality' in the EU and 'conditional spending' in the U.S. It adopts a legal comparative perspective and investigates the EU's very recent practice of conditioning public spending granted to EU Member States against the U.S. long-standing experience on the matter. The paper argues that the analysis of the U.S. experience with conditional spending facilitates a better understanding of the phenomenon in the EU and may usefully enrich the EU policy-thinking on conditionality in future financial frameworks. In particular, the comparative study shows that conditionality may prove an effective governance device to advance important Union-wide policy objectives at the state level. At the same time, the study shows that when used inside established constitutional systems, conditionality is not free from constitutional contestation, and must be tailored in a way that complies with the essential constitutional principles underlying the exercise of power in a federal, multi-level government. Most important, this work shows that the eventual failures of conditionality are very hard to correct through ex-post administrative and judicial control tools. Therefore, a thoughtful ex ante policy planning of conditionality is crucial for its effective operation. The last part of the paper identifies several lessons learned in this respect.
recruitment in colleges, 11 have contributed to the establishment of a politically independent civil service at the state level 12 and have promoted legislation on minimum wage and overtime pay in federally funded activities. 13 Yet, why is the U.S. conditional spending relevant for the EU? This paper argues that the comparative analysis with the U.S. conditional spending system is timely, useful and highly informative for the EU for three main reasons.
Firstly, the EU is now where the U.S. was in the mid-1900s − in an era of massive expansion of conditional spending. While the EU and the U.S. budgets are very different in spending composition and size, 14 in both systems, the expenditure vested at the state level is one hundred percent conditional and the conditions of spending operate in a remarkably similar manner. 15 Secondly, the European Commission has recently started the policy planning of the next multiannual financial period. 16 The current conditions of spending are expected to stay and may be credibly developed to include additional EU policy areas, including structural reforms, asylum and migration acquis, as well as EU's founding values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. 17 Such a reform might have far reaching implications for the EU's policy making and enforcement toolkit in areas where the EU lacks credible instruments to induce change at the national level.
stand-alone budget to support the European Monetary Union, a future European defense Union or other possible European multi-speed Union configurations are agreed upon. 23 On the contrary, it may be reasonably expected that these conditions shall be further consolidated and expanded departing from the current conditions of EU spending.
Hence, the analysis of the U.S. century-long experience with conditional spending may help facilitate a deeper understanding of what the phenomenon is, how it could evolve a medium term and what are its deeper implications for the EU legal system in a long run.
Against this backdrop, the present paper shall first briefly conceptualize the conditions of spending. The following section shall lay down the essential traits of the U.S. and EU conditional spending frameworks, with a particular emphasis on conditions' legal basis, evolution, administrative implementation, enforcement and judicial review. Based on the findings, the third section shall summarize the main similarities and differences of the two legal systems. Finally, several lessons useful to the EU policy thinking on spending conditionality shall be drawn.
For the purpose of consistency, this paper shall use the term 'conditional spending' or 'conditions of spending' when referring to the U.S. legal system and 'spending conditionality' or 'conditionality' when referring to EU. The terms 'spending conditions', 'cross-cutting conditions' or 'conditions' shall be used interchangeably to refer to both the U.S. and the EU systems.
Conceptualizing spending conditions

Spending conditions as a governance device
Spending conditions are essential elements in the art of governing though budgets. As noted by Daintith, a government may choose to deploy conditional financial resources to pursue specific policy objectives -'government by dominium', in complementary or in parallel to binding legal rules backed by sanctions -'government by imperium'. 24 In other words, instead of enacting traditional legal rules backed by sanctions, a government may find it more appropriate to govern through economic means and pursue a given policy goal by granting financial resources with policy conditions attached, under the threat of funding withdrawal in case of failure to comply with the said conditions. Public spending is rich in conditions. While all of them are essential to attain the goal of financial intervention and may attract funding cut-off, only some conditions behave as governance instruments -the so-called 'spending conditionality' in the EU or 'conditional spending' in the U.S.
Various classifications have been elaborated to conceptually distinguish between conditions that put in place mere administrative or financial prudence requirements, on the one hand, and conditions designed to induce broader policy change, on the other hand. 25 For the purpose of this contribution we shall refer to them as administrative and cross-cutting conditions. 26 The administrative conditions are necessary, intrinsic elements of a spending agreement. These usually refer to fiduciary guarantees, objectives of funding, selection rules, institutional arrangements, 23 
EU High Level Group on Own Resources, FUTURE FINANCING OF THE EU: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON OWN RESOURCES DECEMBER 2016, supra note 22; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 22. 24 Daintith, Terence 'The Techniques of Government' in: THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION, JL Jowell & D Oliver (eds), planning, supervision, reporting, evaluation or audit rules. These conditions are rarely contested and taken together, are seen as essential, necessary elements to ensure that the primary goal of spending is achieved -i.e. a highway.
Cross-cutting conditions are distinguished from administrative conditions as they generally tend to have a less direct link to funding and go beyond the primary and immediate goal of spending. In this sense, cross-cutting conditions are an accessory (not necessary) element of spending, pursuing related, yet distinguishable policy objectives, which go beyond the primary goal of the spending intervention. For instance, a cross-cutting condition attached to highway funds may ask a state to adopt an environmental impact assessments statute or put in place a coherent strategy to support women automobility. In both cases the requirements pursue distinct cross-cutting policy goals -environmental protection and gender equality -which are not necessary to achieve the primary goal of funding (i.e. a highway), but are nevertheless successfully advanced through it. When requiring that states enforce and apply legislation on environmental impact assessments, spending internalises an additional policy goal of environmental protection. Similarly, by requiring that states adopt strategies to encourage women's equal access to and usage of cars, spending becomes a driver for gender equality policy.
As underlined by Rosenthal, administrative and cross-cutting conditions often overlap. 27 Take for instance a condition that requires state authorities managing public spending to be gender balanced. Such a condition has both administrative and cross-cutting elements. However, for the purpose of this contribution it is absolutely necessary to distinguish conceptually between the two, as our concern in the next sections lies essentially with the cross-cutting conditions. Based on the above, one may portray cross-cutting conditions as accessory policy requirements attached by the U.S. federal government and the EU to financial benefits offered to states or private recipients, that aim to achieve policy goals which could not have been achieved or would have been more difficult to achieve through direct regulation or policy making process.
As a general rule, cross-cutting conditions attract funding withdrawal in case of poor compliance and exceptionally may attract additional financial incentives in case of good performance -we shall refer to them as negative and respectively, positive conditions. 28 Conditions may also ask for compliance with a given conduct before or after the disbursement of funds -ex ante and ex post conditions.
Cross-cutting conditions may have multiple governance functions. These may ask states to enforce predating but unenforced legal or policy requirements (enforcement function), to pass a law or regulate a certain conduct (regulatory function). Conditions may also seek to implement a new policy framework (policy implementing function) or mandate capacity building and institutional reform (structural function). Irrespective of the functions pursued, it is important to stress that in all instances cross-cutting conditions touch on a wide-array of social, economic, cultural and political issues and, if fully implemented, have the potential to crucially impact our societies, our economies and individual rights enjoyment on the ground. 
The constitutional significance of spending conditions in the U.S. and the EU
Cross-cutting conditions have been vividly discussed in the U.S. constitutional scholarship and enjoy an increasing interest in the EU academic and institutional circles. Two general approaches to crosscutting conditions may be identified in the U.S. and the EU: (1) a critical and (2) a functional one.
In the U.S., the first string of legal scholarship raises concerns regarding the impact of conditional spending on the balance of powers between federal and state governments, on the one hand; 30 and the protection of individual rights, on the other hand. 31 In this context, cross-cutting conditions have been seen at the edge of constitutionality, characterized as "constitutionally permissible but not constitutionally required" tools. 32 Other prominent scholars have argued that conditions are illegitimate and even unconstitutional attempts of the higher level of government to govern 'through the back door' of spending as opposed to the 'front door' of the legislative process. 33 A particular close attention has been paid to cross-cutting conditions requiring goals that go beyond the explicitly enumerated powers of the federal government, which could not have been achieved in absence of spending. 34 Similar concerns have been voiced in areas where the federal government has the power to regulate independently of spending, but nevertheless uses conditions to circumvent or avoid the often inconvenient political or legislative process. 35 On a more profound note, conditional spending has been seen as a tool that fundamentally changed the face of U.S. dual federalism into a cooperative one 36 and has helped rewrite the spirit of U.S. constitution without changing its letter.
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Let us take the example of education and environmental policies to better illustrate the debate. The EU as well as the U.S. federal government do not generally have competence to decide on matters of education at state level. Yet, both the EU and the U.S. may successfully ask states receiving funding to adopt policies that influence education. This is done, for instance, by asking states to adopt active measures to reduce early school leaving, 38 to put in place socially inclusive education systems or to observe specific education performance goals. 39 Similarly, both the EU and the U.S. have the competence to adopt environmental policy and legislation. 40 Yet, in some instances legislators may find it more appealing to advance, reinforce or detail specific environmental laws and policy 30 EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT; A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. 149-199 (1934) requirements through spending intervention, as opposed to direct regulation. 41 The use of cross-cutting conditions as a governance device may decisively shift the balance of power between the levels of government in a federal system or may de facto add to the competences of the federal government in areas not expressly delegated to it.
The second, more modest string of U.S. constitutional literature sees conditional spending as an opportunity to uphold and advance individual rights and national-wide goals, such as free exercise of religion or environmental protection. 42 It has also been argued that conditional spending may support efficient government, solve federal collective action problems, attain uniformity in a multilevel governance setting, promote innovation, foster economic efficiency, and adopt imminent solutions necessary in an ever deeper and more inter-dependent federal system -captured in Justice Cardozo's notorious words: "sink or swim together". 43 The EU law literature on spending conditionality is scarce, but similarly polarized. On the one hand, scholars question the opportunity of conditionality as a proxy enforcement mechanism for EU policies at the national level. 44 On the other hand, conditionality is seen as a precious governance instrument to advance EU values and interests in areas where EU lacks sufficient powers, but is legitimately entitled to act. 45 In this last prevailing view, that largely reflects the EU institutional vision of conditionality, 46 cross-cutting conditions are presented as revelatory EU governance solutions, meant to promote efficiency, strengthen institutions and correct conduct of undisciplined Member States that systematically fail to fully uphold the European laws, policies, values and the European economic rules.
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Having in mind the above constitutional portrait of spending conditions and the broader debates surrounding them, the following sections shall briefly lay out their evolution and current standing in the U.S. and EU legal systems. The sections shall pay a particular attention to the constitutional basis and historical development of conditional spending and shall further inquire on their administrative implementation, enforcement and judicial review. 
Comparative perspectives: the U.S. and the EU
The U.S. conditional spending The U.S. federal government transfers about 600 bln US dollars in conditional grants annually at the state and local level, 48 representing sixteen percent of the federal budget and a share of twenty percent of the overall State and local gross investments. 49 About 80 percent of the above grants are transferred directly to state and local governments; a sum that constitutes three percent of the U.S. GDP. 50 The U.S. federal grants are clustered around eight main spending areas: starting with the most generous spending items of healthcare (56%), social security (18%), education and transportation (11% each), followed by more modest allocations to regional development (2%), agriculture, energy and justice (1% each).
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All federal grants disbursed to State and local governments are conditional, however, conditions depend on the grants' type and thematic area. 52 The categorical grants (formula and project) are generally tailored for specific actions and tend to have the most conditions attached. 53 Block grants are allocated to a broader thematic goal (i.e. healthcare) and are not limited to pre-determined projects, hence accompanying conditions tend to be more relaxed. 54 Finally, revenue sharing grants tend to have the least conditions attached, however these have not been disbursed since 1984.
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The access to U.S. federal grants is in principle optional. Federal grants are a conditional offer of the U.S. Congress (or conditional gift), which can be rejected by the State with no legal consequences. In practice however, States find it increasingly difficult to reject federal funds even if these may be tied to uncomfortable conditions. 56 Consequently, even if not constitutionally required, States tend to be 48 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2017, Historical Tables. Conditional spending has its fountainhead in the spending clause of the U.S. Constitution that grants the federal Congress the power "to provide for [...] the general welfare" of the country. 58 The U.S. Constitution is silent on the conditions of spending, which shape independently in grant statutes and are subsequently detailed in specific grant agreements.
The evolution of conditional spending in the U.S. legal system is closely related to the debate on the scope of federal spending power. The debate goes back to the founding years of the U.S. federation and the intellectual dispute of the U.S. founding fathers Hamilton and Madison. 59 The two held radically different views on the relationship between the federal spending power, on the one hand, and the enumerated federal legislative powers, on the other. 60 While Madison fiercely believed that federal spending must be narrowly construed in subordination of the explicitly enumerated federal legislative powers. As such, Hamilton argued that spending should be read in autonomous terms form the legislative powers, 61 allowing the federal government enough flexibility to support economic growth and to address the "exigencies" of the time. 62 This debate on the reach of the spending power is as important today as it was two centuries ago. While the balance is currently on Hamilton's side, this state of art is far from settled, especially since the Supreme Court can in principle always reconsider its 'Hamiltonian' standing and limit its current broad reading of the U.S. federal spending power. 63 
Evolution
The evolution of conditional spending in the U.S. legal system knows four stages: development, experimentation, expansion and consolidation.
The first development stage dates back to the 1882 Morril Act, which established one of the first categorical assistance programs. 64 The program allocated land grants to state educational institutions and conditioned the latter to provide military instruction to the young people attending the establishment. 65 Subsequently, the establishment of the federal income tax by the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913, facilitated higher spending and consequently the development of numerous conditions of spending. 66 However, the latter were largely administrative in nature and rarely prescribed for additional national policy requirements. 67 The second experimentation stage was triggered by the Great Depression of the 1930s and the follow up New Deal reforms which facilitated increased federal transfers to state and local governments. The most notorious conditions of the period remain the Davis-Bacon Act of the 1931 and the Hatch Act of 1940, establishing a wage floor for employees of federally funded programs and requiring that state administrators of federal grants refrain from partisan political activities, respectively. 69 Both conditions have had a tremendous influence and have been continuously used up to the present days. 70 The start of the third expansion stage was brought by the revolutionary welfare and civil rights reforms of the 1960s. 71 During the time, the number of cross-cutting conditions dramatically expanded, counting fifty nine national-wide conditions by 1980s. 72 The conditions' thematic scope also knew an important expansion. As such, conditions were ingeniously designed to support the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s and the subsequent legislation in the area of non-discrimination, inclusion of handicapped, alcohol and drug abuse prevention, environmental protection, economic advancement, health and human safety, minority participation, labor standards, including minimum wage requirements. 73 The conditions above were supplemented by fund-specific conditions in each area of funding, such as the student and teacher performance conditions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 74 Other examples of thematic conditions in the area of transportation are the prohibition of highway banners (Highway Beautification Act of 1965) and a maximum driving speed of 55 miles per hour (Highway Energy Conservation Act of 1975). 75 It is worth noting that the ex ante enforcement of the speed limit condition (55 mph) was designed to support the national policy goal of reducing fuel consumption during the 1970s oil crisis and managed to secure compliance in a record time of two months of twenty one states opposing the measure.
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The fourth consolidation stage started in the 1980s and continues to the present days. 77 During the period, we assist to a general consolidation of conditional spending practice, with little or no influence from the changing political preferences of the executive or legislative branches. As Posner showed, the use of conditions of spending is in itself a non-partisan phenomenon. 78 While the substantive policy goals of conditions may change from conservative to progressive ends, the strategy of using conditional spending to induce state behavior in line with federal preferences was rarely questioned. 79 As such, in spite of Reagan administration's deregulation efforts in the 1980s, conditions did not decrease but, on the contrary, slightly increased in numbers. 80 One famous condition enacted during the period was the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, that instructed the federal government to withhold about five per cent (now ten percent) of highway grants from states allowing possession or consumption of alcohol at a lower age than 21. In 1990s, during the Clinton administration, the conditions of spending were further consolidated, especially in the area of education. The administration's 'school performance' conditions were signed into law through Educate America Act of 1994 which subjected low performing schools receiving federal funding to a comprehensive set of education performance results and outcomes. 82 The reform is believed to be a turning point in federalization of the U.S. education policy, further limiting the states' power in the area. 83 As a push back on the expanding power of the federal government, in the 1990s the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was passed, prohibiting federal commands addressed to state governments without matching financial allocations. 84 The act however did not manage to limit the reach of the federal spending power, as it explicitly exempts grant conditions from its scope of application.
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In the 2000s the Bush administration continued the use of conditions, albeit with some simplification attempts. 86 Major cross-cutting conditions of the period were established by No Child Left Behind Act which reformed the Clinton era 'student performance' requirements in primary and secondary education. 87 The post-9/11 reform agenda facilitated the establishment of novel conditions of spending deployed through security and emergency preparedness directives. 88 Additionally, the conditions on minimum work requirements for welfare aid recipients 89 and those established by Help America Vote Act are worth mentioning.
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As a novelty, conditions waivers and super-waivers for certain states and projects have been established in 2000s. 91 Waivers were to strengthen state autonomy in federally financed policies and to accommodate state and local specificities. 92 However, in the light of the elaborate pre-conditions states have to meet to benefit from a waiver, the power of the federal government remained strong, as federal agencies retain the last say in waiving or not the conditions of spending.
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The Obama administration continued to actively design and deploy cross-cutting conditions to state and local level. The administration's signature conditions targeted the areas of education and healthcare. Conditions in education included a broader interpretation of Title IX non-discrimination conditions in education as to include transgender students 94 and combat sexual assault on campus. 95 In addition, project-tailored conditions for low performing schools were introduced through post-crisis 82 87 RIVLIN, supra note 78 at 296. 88 Posner, supra note 146 at 397-400. 89 Id. at 393-394.; JAY DILGER, supra note 52 at 36. 90 Pub.L. 107-252 91 The waivers had only a limited simplification impact, see: Posner, supra note 86 at 392; JAY DILGER, supra note 52 at 37. 'School Improvement Grants' and 'Race to the Top' programs. 96 The healthcare conditions attached to Medicaid expansion program (commonly referred to as 'Obamacare' jointly with Affordable Care Act) were designed to assure a much more inclusive healthcare coverage, notably for disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.
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The current Trump administration continues vesting conditions of spending in support of its governance program. As expected, the substantive scope of conditions has shifted from progressive to conservative policy goals, yet the use of conditions is actively continued. The conditions of spending put forwards so far ask States and local authorities to cooperate on federal immigration enforcement policies, subject to funding cut-off in case of refusal. 98 Similarly, conditions linked to the ban of transgender individuals enrolment into the U.S. Armed Services have been revised. 99 Currently, the sexual assault on campuses policy conditions are under revision, potentially leading to funding cut-off for non compliant beneficiaries. these are: political cohesion at the federal level (1), coordination at state level and between states (2), federal-state congruence (3) and public participation (4). 106 Additionally, we notice that outcomes of conditions are decisively influenced by conditions intrinsic factors, such as conditions' initial design, planning and substantive scope. In this respect, conditions that have most often been cited as success examples, tend to prescribe for individual or one-act measures, such as: abolition of school segregation laws, adoption of 55 mph speed limit, adoption of minimum drinking age statues or selective military service registration of men upon college enrollment. 107 On the contrary, conditions that proved difficult prescribed for broad, multiannual affirmative measures, often tailored to induce substantial change in human behavior and reform priory established social, economic, cultural, political or institutional structures, and even reform entire communities, as the challenging examples of inclusive regional development initiatives show. 114 The latter reform was revived during the Obama administration, leading to the establishment of an Inter-Agency Council on Financial Assistance Reform in 2011 115 which was tasked to assist the Office of Management and Budget to develop uniform guidance, training and metrics, including on conditions of spending. 116 The reform culminated with the adoption of an uniform guidance Code of Federal Funding in 2014, establishing the general obligation on federal awarding agencies to ensure full and correct compliance with the conditions. 117 The latter are to compile a clear and transparent list of conditions applicable to spending awards in their respective area of funding and dully inform the recipients on their obligation to comply with the requirements. 118 https://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/fedrtc/appc_march17.pdf spending practices is under way with a particular emphasis on relaxing recipient burden and increasing the efficiency of spending.
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Regarding enforcement, the U.S. federal agencies enjoy a high level of discretion in enforcing conditions, largely endorsed by courts. 120 As a general finding, conditions tend to be rarely enforced against states and more frequently enforced against private recipients.
121 As Pasachoff shows, while funding withdrawal has been ordered on important occasions, conditions remain under-enforced compared to the overall cases of non-compliance. 122 Four main arguments have been traditionally advanced to explain under-enforcement in case of States: the damage by ricochet to most needy private beneficiaries (1) the unconstitutional coercion of States (2) the pressure to spend money (3) and the complex inter-institutional politics of funding cuts (4). 123 However, as Pasachoff convincingly argues, the above four arguments are difficult to defend. First, as cuts are most often ordered precisely against individuals, arguing that cutting-off funding in case of states would hurt individuals is at least incoherent if not contradictory. 124 Second, in Pasachoff's view state sovereignty is reinforced not undermined by cuts in funds, which adds to states' accountability. 125 Third, agencies have large discretion in deciding on the effective amount of cuts, which are most of the times modest and do not interfere with the budgetary execution process. 126 Lastly, the argument that state political pressure always acts as a credible deterrent of cuts severely undermines the federal agencies' power within the overall spending construct.
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Regardless of the arguments brought against or in favor of enforcement, for the moment, underenforcement remains a common finding in the U.S. in case of conditions addressed to States.
Judicial review
The U.S. Supreme Court has been invited to speak on the constitutionality of conditional spending on numerous occasions during the last century and until very recently recognized virtually unlimited discretion to Congress in designing spending and the conditions attached to it.
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The start of the doctrine was marked by the Butler case (1936) 129 whereby the Court embraced the Hamiltonian view of federal spending and endorsed its autonomy vis-a-vis other federal powers. 131 and Oklahoma (1947) cases the Court confirmed the ability of the Congress to set the conditions of spending binding on the states, thus affirming the constitutionality of spending conditions. 132 In the next decades, the Court attempted to set a number of limits on the spending power. 133 These have been brought together under the Dole case (1987) doctrine which still embodies the Court's benchmark test on constitutionality of conditional spending. 134 To pass the Dole test conditions must meet four cumulative requirements: these must advance "general welfare" (1), 135 must be expressed "unambiguously" (2), 136 must be germane to the federal interests in the spending program (3) and must not violate any other constitutional provision (4), here comprised the unconstitutional coercion of states 137 and the constitutional rights of individuals.
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Even if the Dole test seems to substantially limit the federal spending power, scholars tend to agree that Dole doctrine has hardly been able to meaningfully constrain the federal government conditional spending power. 139 In the years to come, the Court applied a closer scrutiny test in cases involving individual rights, however the States claiming intrusive conditional spending coercion from federal level did not enjoy the same scrutiny. 140 As Bagenstos shows, the "general welfare" criterion has been interpreted by the Court in Hamiltonian broad terms (1), the clear and unambiguous contractual notice of conditions has been easily fulfilled by Congress (2) and the conditions' germaneness requirement has not been much of a constraint so long as the federal government is free to set the objectives of spending in the first place (3). 141 With regards to the fourth state coercion criterion (4), when states sovereignty and autonomy arguments were raised, the Court seemed to admit since mid-1900s that where conditions would reach a point at which financial incentives exert a high coercion on States these may be found unconstitutional. 142 However, only in 2012, in NFIB v Sebelius case (Obamacare), the Court found that a condition exerted unconstitutional coercion on States, by threatening to withdraw all prior and future federal health support if a state does not accept the new program conditions. 143 The Court found that such a condition did not leave the State a meaningful option to accept or reject the grant, but was rather a "gun to the head". 144 Yet the Court refused to define the 146 This is so, because first, the Court avoided to establish clear baselines for its coercion doctrine 147 and second, because it leaves scope for multiple 'workarounds' Congress can usefully explore to design future funding conditions. 148 Overall, the case law above shows that the Court finds itself highly constrained in drawing rigid doctrinal limits on conditional spending. When the Court does nevertheless intervene, the changes it introduces are incremental and leave a large discretion to the legislative and executive branches. In this sense, it is worth recalling that it took the Court about one century to adopt a standing on the spending power (Butler case, 1936), an additional half a century to crystalize a set of initial doctrinal limits on conditions of spending (Dole case, 1987) and other two decades to enforce a first limit on conditions addressing states (Obamacare case, 2012).
EU spending conditionality
The EU spending is planned on a multiannual basis 149 152 The EU budget is shaped around seven main items of expenditure. In the 2014-2020 financial period, the largest EU spending envelope goes to direct and structural agricultural aid (38% of EU budget), followed by: economic, social and territorial cohesion aid for less developed regions and strategic investment (34%); EU-wide infrastructure, research and cultural projects (13%); external relations (6%); home affairs (2 %), fisheries (1%) and running costs (6%); See generally on EU budget planning and implementation: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/ 2015/lib/financial_report_2015_en.pdf. and economic cohesion (34 %), home affairs (2%) and fisheries (1%). 154 It is precisely in these areas of spending that conditionality first shaped and substantially expanded during the 2014-2020 financial period. 155 Here, one must note that EU budget expenditure is limited when compared the overall EU-28 domestic government expenditure as a share of the EU-28 GDP (1,2 per cent compared to 47 per cent).
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Nevertheless, EU spending is in no way of marginal importance to Member States. As opposed to Member States' expenditure which is largely dedicated to running costs and welfare spending, EU Funds are mainly allocated to long term capital expenditure and constitute an important source for domestic investment. 157 In
Legal basis
EU spending conditionality finds its source in the EU spending power. However, the EU treaties contain no explicit rule on conditions attached to spending. Pursuant to Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), the Commission implements the EU budget under her own responsibility, in close cooperation with Member States according to the rules of funding regulations adopted by the EU legislators (the EU Council and the European Parliament). It is in these statutory rules of spending that conditions find their primary source. The rules governing spending conditions are adopted jointly by the EU legislators (the directly elected European Parliament and the Council formed by representatives of states) on a proposal from the EU executive (the European Commission) on a multiannual basis. 159 This means that conditions are first designed by the Commission, but their ultimate scope is likely to change during legislative negotiations to accommodate the Commission's progressive vision with the states' national interests and the parliament's citizen-centered position. Therefore, in the EU legal system, the emergence, implementation and ultimately enforcement of a given conditionality must be understood departing from the dynamics of the above legal and administrative process, characterized by a continuous push and pull between the EU and Member States.
Evolution
Until recently, spending conditionality has not been a usual presence in the EU internal policies. Traditionally, conditionality has been a tool of EU external policy, where it first shaped and prosperously developed since the late 1970s. 161 Internally, the evolution of spending conditionality knows three stages: development, experimentation and expansion.
The development stage started in the mid-1990s, upon the establishment of the Cohesion Fund. 162 The fund was to prepare catching up states (then: Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) for the establishment of the single Euro currency area in exchange of compliance with a set of macroeconomic convergence rules established by the Treaty of Maastricht -the macroeconomic conditionality. 163 In the 2000s, the experimentation stage followed. Over the decade isolated cross-cutting conditions continued to shape independently in EU structural, agricultural and fisheries funds legal frameworks. The conditions developed in an uncoordinated manner, being interpreted, applied and enforced in their own area of spending. As such, the EU social and regional development funds were endowed with a EU law infringement conditionality, which allowed the Commission to suspend funding if a state was suspected for breach of EU law. 164 The agricultural funds included an important number of statutory and policy conditionalities requiring farmers to comply with certain minimum environmental conditions -the so-called 'cross-compliance rules' since the mid 2000s. 165 As well, the fisheries fund developed its own conditionalities aimed at reinforcing the European Common Fisheries Policy provisions through spending. As of 2014, the current, expansion phase started. 167 The expansion phase came in a post-2008 economic crisis context, at a time when eight EU Member States faced heavy bail-out financial assistance conditionality packages largely implemented outside the EU treaty framework, 168 and subsequently internalized in the internal EU economic governance process through the European Semester surveillance mechanism. 169 It also comes at a time when EU experienced a deeper constitutional crisis, expressed by the systemic failure of certain Member States to follow key EU policies, give effect to EU legislation and uphold its founding values. 170 These developments have stirred a generalized discourse of conditionality, better governance and efficiency of spending, 171 promoted by the 'EU North' and reluctantly accepted by the 'EU South'; a discourse that ultimately materialized in a massive expansion of conditionality in the 2014-2020 budgetary period.
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In the aftermath of 2014, EU funds allocated to social, regional development, cohesion, fisheries and the rural development pillar of agricultural spending (jointly, the European Structural and Investment Funds, representing about 45% of EU budget) are linked to a comprehensive set of forty-three ex ante 173 and ten macro-economic conditionalities 174 plus one general EU law compliance conditionality. 175 Under the new rules, the ex-ante conditions ask Member States to comply before the start of funding with detailed EU law, policy and structural requirements, 176 whereas the macroeconomic conditions monitor continuous compliance with the EU economic governance 177 Moreover, at all times, all funding must comply with applicable EU law rules. 178 In addition, specific conditionalities have shaped in separate thematic areas of spending. As such, in 2014-2020, farmers accessing agricultural funds are subject to new 'green' conditionality, that complement the prior cross-compliance system. 179 Fisheries Fund is conditioned on full respect of multiple Common Fisheries Policy rules, before and after the release of funding, for both Member States and private beneficiaries. 180 Home Affairs Funds are conditioned ex ante on observance of Schengen rules 181 and ex post on compliance with EU law and human rights standards.
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These conditions bring a substantial policy load to EU budget, in an attempt to make EU spending increasingly relevant to the broader EU governance process. 183 Conditions know a rise in numbers, types, procedural design, thematic reach and functional use, especially in EU policy areas where progress proved difficult or achieved only a limited success. 184 A closer look into the policy areas promoted by conditions shows that each condition is instrumental in addressing particular EU general or state-specific policy interests such as: advancement of EU novel policy objectives, 185 maintenance of existing status-quo, 186 policy implementation, enforcement of EU laws and policies, administrative capacity building or institutional reform.
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The conditions above coerce largely Member States, with the exception of agricultural and fisheries payments where conditions are also addressed to private recipients. However even in the latter case, Member States are responsible to set appropriate legal frameworks, monitor compliance and enforce the conditions on private beneficiaries, being subsequently monitored by and financially liable to the Commission for failure to do so. (2011) . 185 For instance, the agricultural policy 'green payment' conditionality, see note 179 supra. 186 Schengen and human rights conditions that aim to uphold the EU border acquis and human rights status quo. 187 Fisheries and macro-economic conditionalities, see notes 174, 180 supra. 188 In practice the Commission applies corrections or refuses payments to Member States in breach of cross-cutting conditions.
Administrative implementation and enforcement
The responsibility to monitor the implementation and enforce the conditions falls in the vast majority of cases on the Commission and its responsible executive agencies (Directorate-Generals). Exceptionally, in case of macroeconomic conditions, enforcement requires the approval of the Council to order suspension and of the European Parliament to allocate additional benefits. 189 The conditions addressed to private beneficiaries are enforced by Member States under the supervision of the Commission.
Regarding implementation, first data shows that the vast majority of ex ante conditionalities have been fully complied with by mid-2016. 190 At the same time, one should mention that the post-2014 conditionality expansion has brought an enormous administrative burden both at the EU and at the Member States level. 191 The often tangled rules governing the conditions, coupled with the complex rules on spending and the broader EU and national policy frameworks made implementation a much more heavier enterprise than initially anticipated.
192 This is especially true in the case of ex ante conditionalities, which must be fulfilled before spending starts and often demand comprehensive affirmative actions. 193 In result, two negative consequences have been observed. First, conditions, amongst other factors, have contributed to important spending delays in the current financial framework.
194 Second, while the vast majority of ex ante conditionalities have been complied with in a record time, 195 in many instances conditions have been interpreted and implemented as formal check lists, with only marginal substantive policy outputs. 196 Additionally, there is evidence of overlap and divergent interpretation of conditions throughout the responsible units of the Commission in charge of thematic funds. 197 Evaluators have also detected inaccurate reporting by Member States on the applicability or fulfilment of certain conditions. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/how/improving-investment/high-level-group-simplification/ and presentation of the Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/content/streamlined-more-effective-sharedmanagement-7th-meeting-high-level-group 197 A good example in this sense is the divergent application of three equal opportunities conditions (general ex ante conditionalities in the area of gender equality, non-discrimination, disability) of the European Structural and Investment Funds. Our examination of the programming documents shows that the Commission's directorates for employment (DG EMPL) and agriculture (DG AGRI) have strongly required the observance of all equality conditions. On the contrary the conditions are not always present in regional development programs and are completely excluded from fisheries: Finding based on the analysis of the EAFRD and ESF national programmes, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/ruraldevelopment-2014-2020/country-files/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=576&langId=en; EC, Draft Guidance, EMFF Specific Ex-Ante Conditionalities, Version 3 (7 March 2014), p. 12, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/emff/doc/10-guidance-emff-specific-eacs_en.pdf; Finding based on the analysis of the ESI Funds operational programmes, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/ 198 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 184.
Regarding enforcement, conditions tend to be rarely formally enforced against Member States, 199 but frequently enforced against private recipients. 200 In the case of the latter, evaluations of the crosscompliance environmental conditionality attached to agricultural funds show that the system is well functioning, checks are carried out regularly and funds are withdrawn. 201 In subsidiary, where States fail to cut funds, Commission may apply correction or refuse payments -a practice regularly endorsed by the EU courts. 202 Contrary to conditions addressed to private beneficiaries, conditions addressed to the Member States are rarely enforced. In case of Member States the Commission traditionally enjoys a large discretion and therefore, in cases of non-compliance, a dialogue culture is generally favoured. 203 Even if formal enforcement is rare, it is interesting to note that informal enforcement tools have been de facto institutionalized in practice. As such, in numerous cases, Member States do not claim payments until the conditions are in place -the so-called 'self-suspension' mechanism. 204 The mechanism allows states to avoid politically uncomfortable public suspensions of funds and is accepted by the Commission against the promise of future compliance. 205 As we shall argue below such informal mechanisms may raise important legal concerns. The EU Court has also reviewed on multiple occasions the validity of Commission decisions enforcing spending conditionality against states and granted in all the cases a broad discretion to the Commission, first in deciding on the existence of a conditionality breach and second on the effective amount of cuts. 208 The vast majority of these cases deal with procedural rules of spending enforcement, however we have been able to identify one judgment that dealt in a substantive manner with a conditionality prohibiting payments to a state in breach of EU law. 209 In Italy v Commission, the Court upheld the Commission's discretion and held that the Commission could refuse payments if a state is investigated for a breach of EU law, 210 so long as a 'sufficiently direct link' may be identified between the breach of law and the spending measure in question. 211 In establishing the 'sufficiently direct link' test, the Court adopted a broad interpretation of the term 'measure', rejecting Italy's claims that the infringement procedure and the financed 'measure' were not related.
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Since the Court has not yet reviewed reviewed the constitutionality of conditionality addressed to Member States in the light of the EU treaties, to date, the benchmark test to assess the legality of conditions remains the 'sufficiently direct link' doctrine. The latter leaves a large scope of discretion both to the EU legislators in designing conditionality and to the Commission in enforcing it.
Similarities and differences
Similarities
The comparative analysis of conditional spending in the U.S. and EU shows that the two systems have much more in common than one could have initially presumed.
No explicit constitutional consecration
Firstly, we notice that in both systems cross-cutting conditions have their fountainhead in the constitutional spending power. 213 Yet, conditions know no express constitutional consecration neither in the EU founding treaties, nor in the U.S. Constitution. They shape as statutory spending rules adopted by the legislative branches and influenced to a great extent by the executives during the legislative process, but most notably during their actual implementation and enforcement. State for failure to fulfil a EU law obligation under the treaties, under the sanction of a lump sum payment or a penalty payment specified by the Commission. 211 Italy v Commission note 209 supra 212 Id. [53] [54] [55] 213 See pp 6-21 supra. 214 
Id.
In both legal systems the conditions are vested by the higher level of government on state constituencies and private recipients of funds. States nevertheless play an important role in the process. First, states are central and often decisive actors in the initial design and adoption of conditions. 215 Second, the states have an important say on conditions as they have an important discretion in choosing the areas of spending and subsequently negotiate the specific terms of financial intervention. 216 Lastly, and most importantly, states have a pivotal role in the effective implementation and actual application of conditions in each spending area. 217 
Conditionality -a universal governance device
The comparative study shows that conditionality is a virtually universal governance device, highly flexible and capable of remaining conceptually intact while transcending the boundaries of various policies and even legal systems. Both in the EU and the U.S. systems conditions present remarkable similarities in conceptual design and functional use. In both systems conditions shape as ex ante or ex post requirements of spending that pursue a federal policy goal and may lead to withdrawal of funds in case of non-compliance or to additional benefits in case of good compliance (negative and positive conditions). Through conditions, the EU as well as the U.S. federal governments bring additional policy objectives under the umbrella of spending, in many instances advancing what may not be achieved or may be more difficult to achieve through direct legislative and policy making procedures. 218 The use of conditions is wide-spread throughout various policy areas, as: education, research, agriculture, home affairs, transparency, public health, environment et al. Conditions are ingeniously designed to help advance new policies, enforce old ones, regulate or encourage legislation and tackle institutional reforms using the leverage of budgets. Moreover, especially the U.S. example shows that conditions have high resilience over time, being almost immune to political change and highly adaptable to partisan politics. 219 Administrative under-enforcement and weak form judicial review Beyond these highly interesting findings on the nature of conditions, our main findings rest on the tool's administrative (under-)enforcement and (weak form) judicial review in both the EU and the U.S. legal systems.
Administrative under-enforcement against States
The comparative study shows that administrative under-enforcement is very likely, and whilst underenforcement tends to be generalized, the findings show that conditions tend to be more often enforced in case of private beneficiaries and are only very rarely enforced in the case of states governments. 220 Department of Law Working Papers First, it is argued that funding withdrawal hurts ultimately the most needy. 222 Second, it is argued that withdrawal of funds is intrusive to states' sovereignty. 223 Third, it is argued that withdrawal of funds delays spending as a whole. 224 Fourth, it is claimed that the politics of funds denial is a sensitive issue and the bargaining process between states, executive agencies and legislative institutions is an important dissuasive factor. 225 Similar arguments against conditions enforcement are also voiced in the EU. 226 As such, studies preparing the last 2014-2020 EU budgetary reform claimed that suspension of funds for noncompliance with macroeconomic conditions risks to disproportionately affect less developed regions and its beneficiaries, raise questions of equal treatment of Member States, delay funding and hurt economic growth. 227 Sovereignty concerns were additionally raised by Member States during negotiations. 228 As to the politics behind funds withdrawal, the pressure on the Commission shall depend on a case by case basis. While the Commission could be more comfortable to suspend spending in areas of high consensus (i.e. on environmental conditions), the suspension of EU funds for non-compliance in more contentious areas (i.e. macroeconomic conditions) shall be highly difficult and would have to be firstly commonly agreed at the highest level of EU institutions.
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Weak form judicial review
Another important finding is that both the EU and the U.S. judiciary branches tend to adopt a 'weakform judicial review' 230 when ruling on conditions, granting a high level of discretion to the legislative and executive branches in the design, implementation and enforcement of conditions.
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The U.S. scholarly thinking on conceptual problems the U.S. Supreme Court faces when confronted with conditional spending adjudication is enlightening in this respect. 232 As professor Bagenstos and Sunstein have argued, when dealing with conditional spending the courts are faced with deep normative choices on the scope of conditional spending, choices that are far from settled and are better suited for the democratic political deliberation in parliaments rather then for judicial scrutiny. 233 In addition, Professor Fuller's theory on bipolar and polycentric disputes explains the limits courts face in cases that involve polycentric uncertainties 234 such as cases involving questions on the 222 Id. at 253-254. 223 Id. at 253. 224 Id. at 252. 225 Id. at 254.
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, MACRO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONALITIES IN COHESION POLICY 44-47 (2012).
227 Id. at 44-47. 228 Council Of The European Union, Presidency Report on Cohesion Policy, 18097/11, Brussels, 7 December 2011, para. 7a. constitutionality or judicial enforcement of conditions. When attempting to adjudicate on conditions, the courts inevitably run into the polycentric difficulty of multiple economic, political and social preferences at stake that bring a high level of uncertainty to judicial deliberation. 235 In result, a court shall more often than not find it very difficult to substitute its judgement to the legislative or administrative agencies, as the latter actors are generally better placed to balance with a higher level of accuracy the full range of considerations at stake. 236 Consequently, courts shall necessarily find it easier to scrutinise conditions based on formal legality claims, such as prescription, access to justice or right to be heard, rather than examine the core of the problem of whether and to which extent a condition is constitutionally permissible.
Finally, it is worth noting that in both EU and the U.S. systems, judicial review shall be most difficult in the case of conditions that present a rather remote or indirect link to spending. Take for instance a hypothetical 'rule of law' condition in the EU or a prohibition to carry 'guns on campus' condition in the U.S. linked to disbursement of research funds. To address this concerns, both EU and the US courts, have put in place judicial doctrines to ensure that a reasonably close link between spending and the cross-cutting condition exists. In this sense, the EU Court has institutionalised a 'sufficiently direct link' test, while the U.S. Supreme Court established the 'germaneness' criterion in Dole case to examine whether conditions are reasonably related to the federal interest in a given program. 237 It is worth noting that both tests have proven little bite and credible constraint in practice. To date, the EU courts have never struck down conditions based on the 'sufficiently direct link' test. Similarly, the U.S. judiciary has adopted a broad reading of the 'germaneness' criterion, some judges even wondering if the criterion is justiciable, hence fit for adjudication in courts.
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Differences
Functions: U.S. regulation v. EU enforcement
A core difference between the U.S. and EU cross-cutting conditions lies in the functions towards which their use is primarily directed. The comparative insight of the two legal systems shows that the primary function of conditional spending in the U.S. is regulation, while the primary function of spending conditionality in the EU is enforcement. In other words, whilst both in the U.S. and EU cross-cutting conditions may pursue multiple functions, in the U.S. the main goal of conditional spending has been to help expand the federal government's limited power to regulate; whereas in the EU, the aim of spending conditionality has been largely to help the EU enforce its extensive, already existent regulation and policies.
The difference has a historical explanation. The U.S. Constitution has been amended only on limited occasions to expand the federal powers. 239 This meant that the U.S. federal government had to explore different routes to regulate areas outside its reach, but where federal action was deemed necessary. The power to spend and adopt conditional spending programs was one of routes taken to this end.
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Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the EU founding treaties have been repeatedly amended to expand the powers of the EU. 241 As such, the EU treaties give the EU legislators important scope for regulation based on the EU's enumerated powers (exclusive, shared and coordinative competences), the EU's implied powers doctrine, as well as on the flexibility clause (Article 352 TFEU). 242 Despite its extensive power to regulate and adopt broad policy lines, the EU remains limited in the power to enforce its regulation and policy; a limitation that became increasingly acute in the last years.
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Spending conditionality is a tool largely seen as a remedy for the EU's enforcement deficit.
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Specificity and clarity of conditions Another core difference is that conditions tend to be much more individual-tailored in the U.S. and largely state-tailored in the EU. The difference comes with the very different thematic purpose, amounts and subjects of U.S. and EU spending envelopes, that necessarily affect the conditionality's design and scope.
The U.S. largest spending envelopes are directed to healthcare, social security, and education; and spending in these areas is often disbursed to private beneficiaries. 245 The EU budget is largely committed to agriculture, rural and regional development, economic and social cohesion, and funds are disbursed largely to Member States' public authorities. 246 Given the very different areas of spending and the Member States as primary beneficiaries, cross-cutting conditions are very different in the EU and tend to be largely state-tailored.
As a result, EU conditions are often general and suggest only with a limited degree of clarity the effective conduct required, in comparison to their U.S. counterparts. There is also much less clarity for the EU citizens regarding the concrete action required by the EU spending conditions, the Member States action in response and the accountability in case of failure to achieve the prescribed result. The EU conditionality generally gains clarity and tangible social-economic impact only when translated at the national level of the EU-28 through program-specific requirements often negotiated between the Commission and the Member States. As such, at the EU level one rarely encounters conditions directly asking, for instance for: student performance or prohibition of smoking on campus. Nevertheless, such conditions may well shape at the national level during the implementation of EUwide conditions in the area of education, inclusion of vulnerable groups or poverty reduction.
Private enforcement of conditions
The comparative study also shows that private parties and citizens in general have been much more involved in the enforcement process of cross-cutting conditions in the U.S. as compared to the EU. 240 The power to regulate inter-state commerce and the power to tax have also been highly instrumental in expanding the power of the U.S. federal government. It suffices to mention that the 1960s US civil rights legislation has its legal basis on the federal commerce power and not on the reconstruction amendments. This difference finds its roots partially in the U.S. judicial doctrine on remedies 247 as well as in the explicitly enshrined possibility under certain U.S. civil rights statutes to privately enforce cross-cutting conditions. 248 Pursuant to the latter, interested persons can file a judicial complaint against public or private beneficiaries of U.S. federal grants asking for funding cut-off in case the said beneficiaries discriminate or otherwise violate the claimant's civil rights.
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In the EU there is no similar decentralized private enforcement of conditionality.
250 Hence, the compliance or non-compliance with a condition is exclusively a matter between the EU and Member States, and in case of non-compliance it is only for the EU -not for affected individuals -to enforce the conditionality and ask for funding cut-off.
Let us take the example of discrimination to better illustrate the difference. In the EU an individual cannot take a state or another entity to EU courts for failure to respect a non-discrimination conditionality.
251 After the start of funding operations, when a discrimination occurs, the individuals have access to an administrative complaint procedure at the national or EU level, which could lead to funding cut-off only if the Commission finds that the irregularity affected the selection procedure or the financial interests of the EU. However, outside these situations -for instance, if a university receiving EU funds has in place discriminatory practices -an individual cannot launch a complaint against the university or take it to court claiming funding cut-off for failure to comply with applicable non-discrimination law. The individual will have to address an administrative complaint to the Commission or, if discriminated against, seek individual relief under applicable national or EU nondiscrimination law -that would lead most often to an administrative fine.
What can the EU learn from the U.S.?
The experience of the U.S. shows that in spite of significant difficulties and criticism encountered along the way, conditional spending has proven a valuable tool of government. It proved particularly useful in promoting national policy imperatives and addressing collective action problems in areas as education, healthcare, social security or environmental protection. 252 Additionally, the study of the U.S. conditional spending doctrine and policies is particularly valuable as it shows that when used in federal-like and multilevel government setting, such as the one of the EU, conditionality is not simply a policy tool, but it is first and foremost a constitutional matter. As a consequence, the policy planning, administrative enforcement, judicial adjudication and legal study of conditionality should be conceived of only as an intrinsic part of the general principles and norms of the EU constitutional construction. In this context, the principles of conferral, legality, proportionality, equality of Member States, judicial redress, transparency, democratic accountability and fundamental rights must form an indissoluble integral part of all conditionality thinking in the EU. Another important finding is that often conditions may fail and, as shown above, when that happens, both the administrative agencies and the judiciary have limited ex post tools to effectively correct under-preforming conditions. This leads us to the conclusion that a much more focused policy thinking on the initial, ex ante design of conditions is crucial for their successful operation of conditions and attainment of intended policy goals.
Departing from the initial good design imperative, this section attempts to highlight a core set of lessons drawn from the U.S. experience which could be usefully considered during the next EU conditionality formulation cycle.
Focusing conditions on policy objectives
A first lesson learned from the US experience is that the full and correct fulfillment of a condition does not necessarily mean that the policy objective pursued has been actually achieved. 253 The condition's policy objective relies on a clear and measurable focus on results and is not always fulfilled by a mere compliance with the condition's criteria. 254 The current EU conditions tend to suffer from the same disconnect between the actions prescribed and policy results sought. Let us take the example of the EU ex ante conditionality on gender equality to better emphasize the point. 255 The condition asks for inter-institutional arrangements with equality bodies and training of officials in charge of EU Funds on gender equality matters. Yet, even if both requirements are fully complied with, there is a clear risk that conditions turn into formal box ticking exercises with little positive impact on EU gender equality policy. 256 To avoid this outcome, the criteria for fulfillment must constantly be assessed against the primary policy goal of gender equality.
257 Therefore, the condition must not ask whether there is a plan, but whether the content of the plan and its actual implementation is consistent with EU equality policy. Moreover, the conditions must not ask about a training report but about the training results. Beyond asking whether there is an inter-institutional agreement with equality bodies, the condition must ask whether these have the actual capacity to turn the inter-institutional agreement into reality.
Overall, the baseline assessment revolves around a cost-benefit analysis and the question of whether or not the policy is better off with a condition or without it.
258 If a given condition brings no added value to the policy goal pursued (i.e. gender equality), then spending is better off without a condition altogether. By analogy, as hard as it may be to articulate it, EU spending may be better off with no gender equality condition than with a badly designed one, as the implementation of a badly designed condition consumes important resources which could have found a more useful allocation in its absence. 
Balancing conditions and spending
The U.S. experience repeatedly underlines the importance of carefully balancing the policy objectives of conditions with the policy objectives of spending. 259 Starting with the initial financial assistance reform of the 1970s and ending up with the most recent one, all U.S. administrations were continuously concerned with the excessive burden conditions may pose on spending itself.
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The EU practice with conditionality seems to follow a similar path. Here, it is interesting to recall the initial statement of the EU Commissioner for Regional Policy: "[t]his time around no money will be spent if the right conditions are not there, so there is no getting away from ex ante conditionalities".
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Whilst the EU Commissioner's statement might have appealed politically at the start of the financial period, today the serious delays in spending suggest a different discourse. 262 While there are many culprits to blame for the current spending delay, conditionality is beyond doubt one of them. 263 The delay means that EU funds may not fully reach by the end of the financial period their primary milestones. The latter are all highly valuable policy goals, of at least comparable importance to conditionalities, such as: transportation networks, internet and technology infrastructure, shift to low carbon economy, resource efficiency, et al. The concern is of high priority especially in the current economic climate where EU Member States rely dramatically on EU financial resources to support domestic growth.
The EU has no interest to block EU money. EU's interest is to spend EU money in a correct and effective manner, while having the conditions complied with to the fullest possible extent. Ultimately, to ensure the well-functioning of the overall system, the trade-off between spending and the number of conditions attached shall have to be carefully reassessed.
Dealing with complexity
The U.S. experience with conditions has shown a continuous attention to the raising complexity and administrative burden. 264 Demanding paperwork requirements and bureaucratic red-tape have been repeatedly reported as major obstacles in the effective administration of conditions. 265 The fact that administrative simplification has been a constant goal on U.S. financial reform agenda since the 1980s and still continues today suggests that dealing with complexity may prove very difficult in a multilevel government. The current EU experience seems to echo the same complexity concerns. Conditions brought a substantive administrative burden both for the EU and Member States administrations. 267 While conditions were adopted in the 2014-2020 financial framework in the name of funding effectiveness and efficiency, the increased complexity, administrative burden and overlaps risk leading precisely to the opposite result. Here one could usefully mention the 'over-regulation -under-regulation' paradox voiced in the U.S. scholarship. 268 When applied to conditions, the paradox of over-regulation tells us that more complex and demanding conditions (overregulation) tend to be more difficult to implement and are very likely to encounter strong resistance from state administrations and final beneficiaries. Such overregulated conditions risk to be self-defeating, and reach only a limited or even an opposite policy result to the one initially intended; thus, leading to under-regulation. 269 As mentioned already, addressing complexity has not been an easy policy task in the U.S. where simplification reforms are still under way. 270 In turn, EU shall have to undertake its own policy thinking and come up with EU-tailored simplification solutions.
The U.S. experience with condition waivers on the one hand, and high risk grantees, on the other, may provide a starting example for adjusting the conditions to the needs and capacity of their recipients.
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The system allows for relaxing or tightening the conditions on a case-by-case basis and may facilitate simplification and a more balanced distribution of conditions in result. Waivers usually exempt recipients from certain conditions 272 and replace the latter with a set of principles or standards to be observed. 273 On the contrary, high risk grantees are closely monitored on their performance. 274 A differentiation between EU Funds recipients has been already proposed by professor Barca in the 2009 report on the future of EU Cohesion policy. 275 Adjusting the volume of conditions to the need and capacity of recipients would imply that the planning process would start not by asking how many objectives the EU would like to see accomplished through spending conditions, but how many objectives are effectively needed and how many conditions can be realistically handled by the final beneficiary. Waivers may be considered where the States prove that equivalent and satisfactory measures are already in place. In contrast, high risk recipients with a weak track-record on conditions 267 Here, it is sufficient to note that the Cohesion funds ex ante conditionalities alone amount to three thousand in 2014-2020.
If one multiplies this number with the criteria to be fulfilled under each ex ante conditionality the figures become exorbitant. While doing the math we must keep in mind the macroeconomic generous set of conditionality, the subsequent European Semester conditionalities they link to and the additional fund specific conditions of the fisheries, agricultural and home affairs funds. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 190. 268 implementation would receive more technical assistance, whilst being closer monitored by the EU. This could avoid overburdening local administrations and allow for the much-needed local flexibility, experimentation and innovation. A phasing-out process must be foreseen to facilitate the transition between the two categories. Highly important, such a differentiation system must pay a close attention to the principles of equality and non-discrimination.
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Establishing uniform and stable legal frameworks The U.S. experience with spending conditions highlights the importance of a uniform, stable and streamlined legal framework on spending conditions and their subsequent interpretation. 277 As shown by past U.S. programs, a fulfilled condition is only the beginning. 278 Achieving conditions results (i.e. civil rights promotion in education) may prove a much more complex and long lasting process of trail and error, continuous adjustments and effort. 279 To achieve results, a condition must be governed by stable legal frameworks pursuant to which it is continuously applied, observed, enforced, reviewed and internalized to a given legal, political, administrative and institutional culture. 280 From this point of view, the current EU legal framework is not a good fit for conditions for two main reasons. First, the current EU legal framework adopted on seven-year basis is too short to allow a sizable result for conditions. Changing the conditions' rules of the game every seven years repeatedly delays the achievement of results. The ultimate risk is that both Member States and EU administrations never get over the formal paperwork and control exercise.
Second, the EU temporary legal framework hinders the full operation of conditions. If the Commission is too active in withdrawing funding or insisting on a rigorous fulfilment of conditions, Member States will have the tendency to get rid of 'troubling' conditions in the next financial period. 281 In this sense the seven-year cycle of the EU budgetary spending may be a highly disruptive factor for conditions. The policy objectives to be achieved by the current conditions often imply large scale structural, legal and policy reforms, which cannot be but formally implemented in seven years' time. Changing the conditions together with the seven-year life spam of EU budget risks jeopardizing the first progress achieved. It also makes the EU policy objectives vulnerable to polycentric, hugely diverging and often short-sighted financial interests of Member States.
For the above reasons, a stable and uniform legal framework should be preferred. Single rules shall also need one single master in charge of their consistent interpretation. Therefore, if the above proposal is taken on board, the current fragmented interpretation of conditions by each Directorate General of the Commission in charge of thematic spending should be revisited. 282 This would allow 276 TEU, Article 4 (2). 
Improving institutional coordination
Another lesson from the U.S. experience, closely related to the one above, is that the good operation of conditions needs leadership and permanent institutional coordination first of all at the federal level. As such, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is in charge since the 1970s of coordination of awarding agencies and uniform interpretation of financial assistance rules. 283 The recent reform, led to the establishment of an Council on Financial Assistance Reform (CFAR) in 2011 284 tasked to assist the OMB, to develop uniform guidance, training material and metrics on spending in general and conditions of spending in particular. 285 The CFAR is formed from representatives of awarding agencies and the OMB. 286 From this point of view, the EU system shows a mismatch between the new conditions and the old institutional arrangements. While temporary inter-institutional structures on ex ante conditionality implementation and suspension are in place, no permanent inter-institutional structures are present. 287 Moreover, there is no ultimate and stable inter-institutional authority in charge of guiding the interpretation and implementation of spending conditions across the thematic expenditure lines of agriculture, cohesion, development, social, home affairs and fisheries funding, even if those funds present very often high similarities. While, the Commission Directorates responsible for spending management take the lead in the discussions, the Directorates responsible for policy implementation have only consultative role. Therefore, the implementation and evaluation of conditionality's policy results remain strongly compartmentalized at the EU level. Revisiting the EU inter-institutional cooperation and deciding on leadership could be an additional important item of the next financial reform agenda.
Building capacity
The U.S. experience showed that advancing policy goals through spending is a highly complex enterprise which requires advanced capacity at all levels of government. 288 Numerous U.S. case studies on non-discrimination, minority inclusion in education and labor market, inclusion of persons with disabilities or labor rights conditions vividly show how important it is to match the conditions with the real capacities on the ground. 289 To ensure that conditions operate well and achieve the intended results, the states officials in charge of funds management and control must prove high level of expertise in multiple cross-cutting disciplines. To this end, the U.S. 2009 reform has tasked the Council on Financial Assistance Reform (CFAR) to coordinate training on effective and efficient funds management at the federal level. 290 The developed trainings are subsequently available online for the use of state administrations and grant managers. 291 In the EU, capacity building and training is still primarily designed and undertaken at the state level, by the 28 EU Member States' administrations. Moreover, training is often outsourced and presents vague or no EU-wide directions. Such a system may be counterproductive.
Let us take again the example of gender equality conditionality to support this claim. The condition requires training of state officials on EU law and policies on gender equality. 292 Yet, training is left entirely to the Member States. Two problems arise in this context. First, the training content and scope differ tremendously from one Member State to another, meaning that gender equality may have a different meaning throughout 28 EU administrations in charge of EU Funds management. 293 Second, a quick look at training modules prepared in Italy and Romania shows that trainings were rarely linked to EU spending, basic notions of economic development or EU gender mainstreaming. 294 Moreover, training offered participants only a few practical tools to help them give meaning to gender equality in the specific context of EU Funds. 295 Ultimately, if one asks whether EU funds are better off with a gender equality training condition than without, the answer shall be at best a mixed feeling in this particular case.
The bottom line question is: who is the better placed actor to train national officials on correct and efficient spending management and conditions implementation: the EU or Member States? The answer must be: both, the EU and Member States. Nevertheless, the EU must necessarily take the lead by preparing EU-wide training modules easily accessible online and require that subsequent national training include essential minimum standards, necessary for a meaningful training at state level. Such minimum standards must at least include a basic understanding on what the conditions mean in the EU context, how they may prove useful for state-specific EU funding and what are the ways to actually translate the condition policy goals into the every-day practice of EU funds operation. General and abstract training, while interesting for participants, will add little if anything to the specific context of EU spending in a given Member State so long as officials are not given tailored advice and relevant examples on how i.e. gender, environment or any other policy goal promoted through conditionality 293 Compare the case of Italy and Romania. While Italy concentrated on EU legal framework and case law on gender equality, Romania has adopted a sociological approach, with a particular emphasis on the national framework and only one page generic reference to the EU Charter listing its main titles. See: Italy training module http://europa.basilicata.it/feasr/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Allegato-2-Condiz-G2-Parità-di-Genere.pdf; Romania training module: http://api.components .ro/uploads/1d3a0bf8b95391b825aa56853282d5da/2016/10/MODULUL_II_proiect_POAT.pdf 294 While the training module for Italy briefly listed the EU funding programs relevant for gender equality in the country, the training for Romania makes no reference on how the equality may be promoted in the use of EU Funds. See: Italy training module http://europa.basilicata.it/feasr/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Allegato-2-Condiz-G2-Parità-di-Genere.pdf; Romania training module: http://api.components.ro/uploads/1d3a0bf8b95391b825aa568 53282d5da/2016/10/MODULUL_II_proiect_POAT.pdf 295 Id. may be effectively reflected in their everyday work. Additionally, coordinating training from the EU level may prove more financially efficient.
Acknowledging the costs of conditions
The assumption that conditions bear no budgetary cost has been heavily criticized and ultimately well acknowledged in the U.S. 296 Not the same is true for the EU, where spending conditions are still largely 297 presented as cost-free governance tools that are meant to achieve fundamental reforms at no additional price. 298 This presumption is wrong and must be necessarily revisited. Conditions do cost. The well-functioning of conditions relies greatly on year-marked human and budgetary resources meant to cover for expertise, administrative and operational costs of conditions. Only the implementation of the training criterion of gender equality, non-discrimination and disability conditions in one single Member State in the 2014-2020 period involved a cost of EUR 1,5 million EUR from EU resources and half a million in state matching funds. 299 Indeed, not every condition will imply a high cost of implementation. Some Member States might have already committed resources and institutionalized procedures to deal with certain conditions. Others however have not. Therefore, an accurate assessment of conditions' cost at the very incipient stages of conditions planning would avoid situations where insufficient or unforeseen financial, time and administrative costs hinder the well-functioning of conditions. At the same time, a cost assessment exercise would usefully assist both the EU and its Member States in taking informed decisions concerning the conditions' necessity, potential and expected results.
Enforcing conditions in a robust and transparent manner
The U.S. general practice of under-enforcement of conditions has been challenged by constitutional scholars. 300 In the case of EU, one must also restate that as a general finding conditions are rarely formally enforced against Member States, however informally, Member States and the Commission agreed not to spend EU funds until the conditions are fulfilled, thus a de facto (self-) enforcement mechanism has been put in place. 301 This state of the art is not satisfactory as it gravely hinders the principles of transparency and accountability that guide the exercise of power inside the EU. Whilst suspension of funds may certainly not always be desirable, the suspension of funds or the deferral of suspension must be transparent and dully reasoned. The enforcement or not of a condition is about much more than the suspension of money. It sends a clear political message for compliance. It allows the European citizens to hold their states accountable for failure to comply. It enables stakeholders to mobilize and actively engage with the state authorities in the process of compliance. Enforcement also encourages public participation and alternative solutions if conditions turn too intrusive or badly designed. All these benefits are eroded by the informal enforcement or by the failure to enforce the conditions altogether. Whilst the Commission may have reasonable motives not to enforce certain conditions, a generalized policy of non-enforcement or informal enforcement should be reconsidered. Alternatively, similar to the civil rights conditions in the U.S., 302 the option of decentralized enforcement of conditions by individuals may be considered to shift the politically uncomfortable and resource limited enforcement burden from the Commission to private beneficiaries of funds. In such a scenario, individuals could also hold States liable for failure to implement spending conditionality and exert additional pressure on state governments to comply.
Conclusion
The EU funds are a crucial EU policy tool, highly visible and immediately tangible to the European citizens. The conditions attached to them in the 2014-2020 financial framework are very recent and little explored. This paper has tried to assess the conditions' impact and potential departing from the U.S. long standing experience on the matter.
The paper found that EU is where U.S. was about half a century ago in experimenting with conditionality's promise and achievements. In spite of wide constitutional debates on the use of conditions, these have been employed in a sustained manner by both progressive and conservative governments to achieve important policy goals, especially when alternative tools proved insufficient.
Findings drawn from the U.S. experience inform the EU that the use of conditional spending is above all a constitutional matter and must be used with due regards to the internal constitutional safeguards. The U.S. experience additionally informs us that administrative under-enforcement and a weak form judicial review is not only specific for the EU system, but is rather a general trait of conditional spending. This led us to the conclusion that the good initial design of conditionality is of crucial importance to its successful operation.
Departing from this conclusion the last part of the paper attempted to list some of the most relevant lessons learned that could enrich the current EU reform discussions on conditionality. The lessons learned showed that conditions must be better matched to their policy objectives, harmoniously complement the overall spending execution process, be integrated in well-coordinated administrative structures, enjoy stable legal and institutional frameworks, with due attention to the recipient's capacity and implementation costs. This paper also argued for a more transparent enforcement of conditions.
Overall, the findings above show that spending conditionality may be a highly useful, yet highly context-dependent governance device, subject to a large array of limitations. Therefore, a thoughtful ex ante policy planning of conditionality that closely observes the structural limitations and constitutional guarantees underlined above is crucial for the successful operation of the tool at the EU level.
